By Margaret Gilbert
Margaret Gilbert deals an incisive new method of a vintage challenge of political philosophy: while and why may still I do what the legislation tells me to do? Do i've got distinct duties to comply to the legislation of my very own state and if this is the case, why? In what feel, if any, needs to I struggle in wars during which my state is engaged, if ordered to take action, or endure the penalty for legislation breaking--including the dying penalty? Gilbert's obtainable e-book deals a provocative and compelling case in prefer of voters' responsibilities to the country, whereas reading how those might be squared with self-interest and different competing concerns.
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Extra info for A Theory of Political Obligation: Membership, Commitment, and the Bonds of Society
These phrases become open to a variety of interpretations (which they have, indeed, received). Things are pinned down very little by the phrases themselves. I shall therefore not strip any more from Hart’s characterization of obligations. I shall maintain within it the notion of ‘owing’. In this way it retains some substance. In the literature, obligations simply characterized as obligations ‘to’ another person, correlative with rights of that person against the person with the obligation, have become known as ‘directed’ or ‘relational’ obligations.
Kavka’s concerns are still in principle less restricted than those of the membership problem, which is only concerned with a speciﬁc type of ground of obligation or, more broadly, reason for compliance, namely, membership in some intuitive or everyday sense. A third difference between Kavka’s problem of political obligation and the membership problem as I have stated it is this. 41 I focus on this way of formulating the problem shortly. I shall also focus shortly on the fourth difference, which is that Kavka qualiﬁes the kinds of reasons he is interested in as ‘moral’ ones.
He had become absorbed in his work and it was too late to post the return when he stopped for a rest. Remembering his decision, he is likely to feel things have gone off course. ’ This would not be the case if, in his estimation, his decision in no way spoke in favour of his acting as he had decided. Mike’s likely reaction to his failure to do what he decided to do suggests that a decision does not only give one reason (in my sense) to do what one decided to, do. 6 I say that X has sufﬁcient reason for performing A if and only if a consideration C that speaks in favour of X’s doing A is such that, all else being equal, rationality requires that X do A, given C.