Download Anti-Individualism: Mind and Language, Knowledge and by Sanford C. Goldberg PDF

By Sanford C. Goldberg

Sanford Goldberg argues right account of the verbal exchange of information via speech has anti-individualistic implications for either epistemology and the philosophy of brain and language. partly 1 he bargains a unique argument for anti-individualism approximately brain and language, the view that the contents of one's techniques and the meanings of one's phrases count for his or her individuation on one's social and typical atmosphere. partly 2 he discusses the epistemic measurement of data communique, arguing that the epistemic features of communication-based ideals depend upon beneficial properties of the cognitive and linguistic acts of the subject's social friends. In acknowledging an ineliminable social measurement to brain, language, and the epistemic different types of data, justification, and rationality, his publication develops primary hyperlinks among externalism within the philosophy of brain and language, at the one hand, and externalism is epistemology, at the different.

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Extra info for Anti-Individualism: Mind and Language, Knowledge and Justification

Example text

Here it will be granted that, even supposing that Henrietta does know that it is a sunny day today, Henrietta’s knowledge is not correctly characterized as knowledge through Slobodan’s testimony. 3, easily explains this. This case thus contrasts with a second case in which Hallie, a doctor, observes the testimony of Steve, her patient, to the effect that it is sunny today. In that case, should Hallie accept the testimony, Hallie would then be relying epistemically on Steve, in the way characterized above.

What is more, he competently identifies the type of speech act performed in each case: he can reliably discriminate assertion from guess, request from command, and so forth. And he typically forms beliefs in what was said only when he discerns the case as one of assertion; but in such cases he always accepts the testimony (at least whenever he doesn’t already have the belief in question). Now suppose that Jim occupies a room full of liars. But suppose that, luckily, he happens upon the only truth-teller in the room.

Assuming (as I am) that knowledge requires reliable belief, and assuming (what is plausible) that a speaker who offers unreliable testimony has given expression to an unreliable belief, we get the result that, in these cases, the speaker fails to have the knowledge (or reliable belief) that she aims to be transmitting to the hearer. In this way we see that the challenge I am presenting against the proposed characterization of epistemic reliance is also, and at the same time, a challenge to the transmission model of testimonial knowledge.

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